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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Anti-trust Laws-Sherman Anti-trust Act-Professional Sports
The Supreme Court, in Radovich v. National Football League,1 has
added another professional sport to the growing list2 of those which are
now subject to the provisions of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.3 In this
case, plaintiff, a former professional football player for a member of the
defendant league, sued to collect treble damages under the Clayton Act4
for a violation by the defendant of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.5 He
alleged that through a method of blacklisting6 he was prevented from
becoming player-coach on a team of an affiliated league,7 and that the
result of this blacklisting was to prevent his employment in organized
football in the United States. He further alleged that the defendant
league scheduled football games in various cities and that a significant
portion of gross receipts was derived from the transmission of these
games over radio and television.8 The defendant contended that the
organization of professional football had been patterned after that of
professional baseball and that since baseball had been exempted from
these laws, the doctrine of stare decisis should apply. The court held
that the business of football came within the meaning of the act and
further stated that the rule which had been established in the earlier
1352 U.S. 445 (1957).2 Boxing and basketball have been held to constitute interstate commerce with-
in the meaning of the act. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S.
236 (1954); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
'26 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
'38 STAT. 731 (1914); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
226 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952), reading in pertinent parts
as follows:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal ....
"Every person who shall mohopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor . ..."
'This is the commonly used term denoting that a player is no longer eligible to
play.
" The Pacific Coast League, which was not in competition with the National
Football League, offered plaintiff this job, but withdrew the offer when the de-
fendant advised them that plaintiff was blacklisted and that severe penalties would
be imposed on the league if he were signed. 352 U.S. at 448.
' Through the use of these two conveyances, the narratives and the pictures of
the spectacle itself are transmitted across the state lines. For this reason radio
and television have played a major role in the recent decisions for violations of the
anti-trust laws. The first court to recognize their importance was Gardella v.
Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
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baseball cases9 was specifically limited to the business of baseball and
was not controlling insofar as any other sport was concerned. 10
Professional sports, and the applicability of the anti-trust laws to
them, have had an interesting history in the courts with results as un-
predictable as the athletic events themselves. The first case to reach the
Supreme Court regarding this subject was Federal Baseball Club v.
National League."' Here, plaintiff had been a member of the Federal
Baseball League. Through a pre-arranged plan of all the members
except plaintiff, this league was dissolved in 1915 and the American and
National Leagues were formed. Plaintiff was not included in either of
these leagues. It brought its action under the Sherman Act alleging
that the defendants had conspired to monopolize the business of giving
baseball exhibitions. The Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the
business was that of giving exhibitions of baseball, that the travel from
state to state in order to give these exhibitions was a mere incident of
the game itself,12 and that personal effort, not related to production,
was not a subject of commerce.' 3
Following this decision, baseball enjoyed more than twenty years
without interference from the courts. But in 1946 efforts to lure players
from the major leagues into the newly formed "Mexican League"
prompted the Commissioner of Baseball to take drastic action, and the
anti-trust problem, which had remained dormant since 1922, was re-
opened. The players who "jumped" to the Mexican League were sus-
pended from organized baseball1 4 for five years.' 5  After playing for a
' Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) ; Federal Baseball Club
v.'National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
10 The dissenting Justices, being unable to distinguish football from baseball,
felt that they were bound by those two decisions. 352 U.S. at 455, 456.11259 U.S. 200 (1922).
1 That this statement is no longer true cannot be denied. In 1956 the Chicago
White Sox, a baseball team of the American League, spent $91,059 for the trans-
portation of its players to the various cities to participate in these "local exhibi-
tions." Hearings Before the Anti-Trust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 2, at 2044 (1957).
1" Personal effort has now been made the subject of commerce. United States
v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955) (performances on the stage were held to consti-
tute commerce) ; United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S.
485 (1950) (business of a real estate broker was held to be trade under the act).
1 There are now approximately 400 baseball teams under the jurisdiction of
organized baseball. This includes the American and National Leagues, com-
monly known as the major leagues, and 40 other leagues which compose the minor
leagues. In 1956 there were fifty million spectators who paid one hundred
million dollars to see ten thousand players perform in thirty thousand games. 103
,CoNG. REc. A5325 (daily ed. July 3, 1957).
ajor League Rule 15 was amended to authorize the suspension which the
'Commissioner had already imposed. Hearings, supra note 12, at 61. These rules
'have now been revised and the penalty of five years mandatory ineligibility for a
major league player who jumps his contract or reservation has been completely
eliminated. Hearings, supra note 12, at 122. Rule 15 (d) now provides that
such ineligibility, reinstatement, or complete disqualification, is in the sole dis-
'cretion of the Commissioner of Baseball in the major leagues and the President of
[Vol. 36
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short time in Mexico they applied for re-instatement. When the Com-
missioner refused to lift the suspension, a few of these players turned to
the courts for relief. The most important of these cases was Gardella
v. Chandler,16 in which an action was initiated under the illegality of
restraint clause of the Sherman Act.17 It was dismissed in the district
court for want of anti-trust allegations, but the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit voted two to one to send the case back for a trial
on the merits. Chief Judge Learned Hand stated that if the business
of television and radio, in addition to the personal effort and travel
which had been insufficient in the Federal Baseball case, were enough
to give the business an interstate character, plaintiff had stated a valid
claim for relief. Judge Frank felt that the business was a monopoly
which, with the reserve clause,' 8 possessed characteristics repugnant
to the moral principles of the thirteenth amendment condemning in-
voluntary servitude.19 Judge Chase dissented, saying that he was bound
by the Federal Baseball case, and that radio and television were com-
parable to the telegraph wires which had been used earlier to transmit
reports of the games.2 0  Baseball, not anxious to have the Supreme
Court rule on this decision after such distinguished judges had spoken
in the lower court,21 settled with Gardella.22
the National Association if it concerns a minor league player. Hearings, supra
note 12, at 1675.
" 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
1126 STAT. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
"s The reserve clause in its present form is a clause in the contract between
the club and a player which gives the club an option on the player's services
in organized baseball for life. The player, once he has signed his first contract,
becomes the sole property of that club and he may be traded or sold by the club
at any time. Furthermore, he is at the mercy of the club owner with regards to
his salary, except that in the major leagues, salaries may not be less than $6,000.00
per year, nor may a player's salary be reduced more than 25% of that which he
earned during the preceding year without his consent. Hearings, supra note 12,
at 1493. Football contracts, contrary to common belief, do not have this per-
petual option to renew. Since 1947, the standard player contract has contained
only a modified reserve clause giving the club the right to renew the contract for
one year at a salary not less than 90% of that received by the player the preceding
year. Nor may the club exercise its option for more than one year. Hearings,
supra note 12, at 2750. But football has a selective draft system which prevents
eligible college players from acting as free agents even before they sign their first
professional contract. The purpose of this system is to produce evenly matched
teams and keener competition so as to give the fans a better exhibition. This
is accomplished by having each team submit a list of the eligible players which
it desires to have, and at a meeting of all the clubs a drawing is held commencing
with the reverse order of the championship standings of the preceding year so that
the team finishing last will get first choice, the team finishing second from last
second choice, and so on until all the eligible players desired have been chosen.
Hearings, supra note 12, at 2580s.
10 172 F.2d at 409. 20 Id. at 404.
21 Commissioner Chandler, being questioned on this subject said, "I do not
think our lawyers thought we could win." Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Coininittee on the iudiciary, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 6, at 290 (1951).
"2 Two other suits, involving Max Lanier and Fred Martin, were also settled
19581
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Immediately following these cases, legislation was urged by friends
of baseball to exempt professional sports from the anti-trust laws.
Bills were introduced in the House of Representatives to this effect.28
A subcommittee was appointed to study organized baseball as a monopoly
power. After extensive hearings in which many persons connected with
baseball testified, the subcommittee submitted a report to Congress 24
which concluded that baseball in all probability could not operate success-
fully without some form of a reserve clause, that they disapproved of
exempting baseball from the anti-trust laws and* recommended that no
legislative action be taken at that time. The subcommitee indicated
that Congress should not pass any legislation until the Supreme Court
had made clear its position.
The chance for the Supreme Court to state its position came in 1953
in Toolson v. New York Yankees.2 5 But in a per curiam decision of one
paragraph, the Court examined the holding in the Federal Baseball
case, the fact that Congress had not passed any legislation on the
subject since that case, and then said: "Without re-examination of the
underlying issues, the judgments below [dismissing the complaint] are
affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs . . . so far as that de-
cision determines that Congress had no intention of including the busi-
ness of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-trust laws." 26  Mr.
Justice Burton wrote a strong dissenting opinion, stating that "the
present popularity of organized baseball increases, rather than dimin-
ishes, the importance of its compliance with standards of reasonableness
comparable with those now required by law of interstate trade or com-
merce."
2 7
It would seem that this decision clearly indicated the Court's
position. Yet in 1955, in a suit initiated by the Government,2 8 the
Court held that professional boxing was within the meaning of the act
and that the Toolson case neither affirmed nor overruled the Federal
Baseball case and was not authority for exempting other businesses.2 9
when Commissioner Chandler reinstated all eighteen players who had violated
the reserve clause of their contracts after three years of their suspension had
been served. Hearings, mtpra note 21, at 343.22 H.R. 4229, 4230, 4231, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).2
' H.R. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
-- 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 28346 U.S. at 357.
"'Id. at 364-65.
- United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
2 "It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating factor
between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football or tennis, and
baseball insofar as the conduct of the sport is relevant to the criteria or considera-
tions by. which the Sherman Law becomes applicable to a 'trade or commerce.'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in United States v. International Boxing Club,
348 U.S. 236, 248 (1955).
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Earlier, in United States v. Shubert,30 the Court had stated that Toolson
was a narrow application of stare decisis.
The only other professional sport which has been ruled on is basket-
ball. In a district court decision,3 1 it was held that professional basket-
ball as conducted by the defendant on a multi-state basis caused this
sport to be subject to regulation by the Sherman Act. Here again, the
sale of radio and television rights was given great weight in reaching
the decision.
The present situation places the Court in an unenviable position.
As a result of its decisions, baseball, the originator of the reserve clause
and agreements among clubs to blacklist, and whose organization has
expanded to the point that it embraces every section of the United
States, is exempt from the anti-trust laws. Football and basketball,
whose organizations were patterned after baseball, and which are rela-
tively small enterprises when compared to that sport, are not favored
by such an exemption. The Court recognized that its decisions might
be considered inconsistent in the Radovich case when it said: "If this
ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer,
aside from the distinctions between the businesses, that were we con-
sidering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate
we would have no doubts."3 2 There is, however, some justification for
the method the Court has used in handling the problem. When the
Federal Baseball case was decided, the Court was dealing with a problem
of congressional intent. It was decided that baseball was not intended
to be covered by the anti-trust laws. After a long period of inaction
by Congress, there was good reason for the Court to affirm its stand
in the Toolson case. But in dealing with other professional sports,
the Court is free to apply stare decisis narrowly and approach the prob-
lem more realistically, in accordance with changed conditions.
Congress is making another attempt to solve the problem at this
time. There are now a total of seven bills before the House. These
bills fall into three categories which present the possible solutions:
(1) exempt all professional team sports from the anti-trust laws ;33
(2) place baseball under the act ;34 or (3) place the four major team
sports under the act, but specifically exempt from anti-trust enforcement
certain practices considered essential to the successful operation of these
30348 U.S. 222 (1955).
"Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147
F. Supp. 154 (1956).
"2 352 U.S. at 452.
"H.R. 5383, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
H.R. 5307, 5319, 85th Cdng., 1st Sess. (1957).
1958]
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sports.35 The hearings of the subcommittee have been completed, but
as of this writing, no report has been published of its recommendations.
ROBERT G. WEBB
Constitutional Law-Limits on Power of Congressional Investigation
In Watkins v. United States1 the Supreme Court of the United
States again considered the constitutional limits on the power of con-
gressional investigation. In that case a labor union organizer was
questioned by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities. The Committee's authorizing resolution2 directed it to in-
vestigate "un-American propaganda activities." The witness was will-
ing to and did divulge his past political activities and the activities of
those whom he believed were still members of the communist party.
However, while disclaiming the privilege against self-incrimination, he
refused to tell whether he knew certain named persons (some of whom
were not connected with labor) to have been members of the com-
munist party, because he believed that they were not members at the
time of the investigation. He was indicted and convicted for "contempt
of Congress." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed 4 the conviction and held that it was proper for the trial court
to exclude evidence5 offered by the defendant to prove that the Com-
mittee claimed a power of exposure independent of the legislative func-
tion and was interrogating him pursuant to this claimed power. The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on other grounds. 6
In the trial court and in the court of appeals the defendant argued
$ H.R. 6876, 6877, 8023, 8124, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). These four sports
are baseball, football, basketball, and hockey.
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 STAT. 812 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
5, 15, 31, 33, 34, 40, 44 U.S.C.).
152 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).;
'233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
' The trial court excluded statements from house committee reports, house com-
mittee hearings, the Congressional Record, and newspapers to the effect that the
Committee asserted an independent power of exposure. Also excluded was evidence
offered to prove that the Committee already had in its possession the information
that it sought to acquire from defendant.
6 There were two principal reasons for reversal. First, the vagueness of the
Committee authorizing resolution inadequately safeguarded against the dissipation
of constitutional freedoms because of the impossibility of: (1) weighing congres-
sional need against private rights; (2) determining pertinency; (3) the Commit-
tee's limiting its questioning to statutory pertinency. Second, the vagueness of
the authorizing resolution denied the witness notice of the subject of the investiga-
tion with the same degree of exactness required by the due process clause in the
expression of any element of a criminal offense.
This latter reason raises a question of comparing investigating committee hear-
ings with criminal trials for purposes of the due process requirement of certainty
in criminal statutes. See 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 98 (1957) ; 106 U. PA. L. REv.
124 (1957).
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